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Abstract
We model the supply side of the banking sector, two types of house-
holds and a land asset collateral in a small open economy model that
accounts for some of the most enduring features and provisions of the
Franc Zone. The model is estimated using the Metropolis-Hasting al-
gorithm and Cameroon’s annual data from 1979 to 2016. Four findings
stand out. First, sensible posteriors of some deep parameters are ob-
tained when the proportion of rule-of-thumb households is set to forty-
eight percent. Second, permanent technology, bank profit, consumption
and foreign inflation shocks are the main drivers of macroeconomic fluc-
tuations. Third, among those shocks, only a bank profit shock, which is
associated with a sharp drop of wholesale interest rates, leads to an out-
put expansion. Fourth, fiscal policy matters but through its effects on
banks’ balance sheet.
Key Words: Franc Zone - Cameroon - Land Collateral - Rule-of-
Thumb households - Metropolis-Hasting
JEL Classification: C68 E32 F41 F45
1 Introduction
The Franc Zone (FZ) is constituted by the Central African Economic and Monetary
Community (CEMAC) and the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)1.
Until the 1972 Accord, no contractual agreement had defined the tools and the goals
of monetary policy in the Franc Zone countries (FZC). The 1972 Accord led to the
creation of the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) which subsequently presided
over the amount of loan to be extended to specific sectors of the economy, such as
agricultural and foreign oriented sectors, by setting a ceiling to commercial banks’
refinancing.
In the nineteen-eighties, the FZC went through a deep economic, banking and ex-
1 The CEMAC is made up of six countries: Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Re-
public of), Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. The members of the WAEMU are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
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change rate crisis. Eventually, a maxi-devaluation of their common currency, the CFAF,
was decided in January 1994 and the direct management of loans to the private sector
was discontinued. The CEMAC was created in the same year and became operational
after the ratification of the treaty by all its members in 1999.
Since then, under the aegis of the French Treasury and the Banque de France,
BEAC’s new mandate is to pursue a low inflation (around 3%) and keep an adequate
amount of foreign exchange reserves to back M2 money supply. To hit those aggre-
gate monetary policy targets, monetary policy instruments are set at their country-
specific values because economic integration is deficient in the CEMAC monetary
union. Specifically, BEAC’s Monetary Programming (MP) model is run at a coun-
try level to check that government credits, quantitative targets on BEAC refinancing of
commercial banks, and required reserve ratios are in accordance with BEAC monetary
targets (Honohan (1990), Iossifov et al. (2009)). For example, the country-specific M2
is set by analyzing and extrapolating the balance of payments’ deficit and the financial
needs of the private and the public sector.
CEMAC’s monetary authorities used to consider that MP and the declaration of
BEAC’s mandate were an improvement from the policy practice prior to 1994. By the
end of 2017, they were still contemplating the end of MP in order to "calibrate monetary
policy operations based on autonomous liquidity factors forecasts" (IMF (2017a, b)).
We do not deal with FZ’s monetary policy per se. Instead, our aim is to contribute
to an informed decision making on such policy by tackling the effects of shocks in a
DSGE open economy model where some of the most enduring features of FZ’s mon-
etary policy and institutional provisions are parametrized. We depart from estimating
reduced form equations (BEAC (1994)) that is implicit in the MP approach by using the
Bayesian approach because it alleviates some of the pitfalls pertaining to data scarcity
or quality invoked by the proponents of MP2.
This is not an easy task for a typical FZC though. In fact, since the inception of the
FZ or more recently of the CEMAC, numerous targets and instruments have been set
forth, a few of them have been enacted, albeit with various degree of compliance (Co-
quet et al. (1992), IMF (2016), Nkodia (2011), Iossifov et al. (2009)). The last iteration
of the convergence criteria relies on a three-year average formula of a set of indicators
i.e. an essentially backward looking framework. For example, from the 2017 budget,
the new fiscal balance criterion sets a floor of -1.5 percent of GDP on the reference
fiscal balance (IMF (2017b), (IMF (2019a))3. The purpose of achieving convergence
criteria for the level of foreign and government domestic debts4 is to achieve a mod-
erate inflation in member countries and safeguard the integrity of a monetary union
which is more institutional than optimal.
2 For example, prior distributions of unknown parameters can be used to set restrictions on their estimated
values though the related time series are not available while measurement errors in observed time series
can be partially accounted for. Some ground work has been undertaken in Nana-Davies (2018).
3 The new criterion defines the reference fiscal balance as the overall fiscal balance minus the sum of
20% of oil revenue and 80% percent of the difference between oil revenue and their average relative to
GDP over the previous three years (IMF (2017)).
4 Aside from the floor on the reference fiscal balance, the new set of convergence criteria includes: 3%
target for consumer inflation, 70% cap on the public debt to GDP ratio and a negative ratio of the change in the
stock of arrears (domestic and foreign) to GDP (IMF (2019)).
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For a member of any kind of currency union, devising a sound fiscal policy is
particularly valuable because fiscal policy tools only are available to its government.
Since government expenditures and revenues data series are sketchy for all CEMAC
countries, such a goal seems to have been mostly off the radar5. Because of missing
data series, the identification of parameters related to a fiscal feedback policy rule fails
when a Bayesian estimation is attempted. We use calibrated parameters to gain an
insight into the effects of fiscal policy shocks6.
Since its creation, the CFAF has been pegged to France’s currency at a fixed ex-
change rate. In our model economy, the fixed exchange rate feature of the FZ arrange-
ment is captured by assuming that base money is endogenous and that France’s infla-
tion rate is used as the target inflation when domestic producers set their prices with
a Calvo-pricing procedure. In fact, pegging the CFAF exchange rate to the Euro or to
whichever French currency is per se ensuring long run inflation rate convergence be-
tween the CEMAC countries and France. Moreover, the endogeneity of base money is
germane to a fixed exchange rate unless perfect sterilization is put in place. During our
estimation period, moderate inflation has been mostly achieved in CEMAC countries
by setting a ceiling on monetary budget financing to twenty percent of the previous
year’s tax revenues7.
The non-accumulation of external payment arrears has a safe place in the three
iterations of multilateral surveillance. Over the forty years span between 1979 and
2018, the peak years for the ratio of external payments arrears to GDP were different
from one country to another, leading one to infer that some country-specific factors
might be at work8. In contrast, over that time span, external arrears accumulation
occurred at least one in two years in CEMAC countries, suggesting that there may also
be a common cause for external arrears accumulation in those countries9. We do not
explore those two issues in depth in our model. However, we take the non-accumulation
of external payment arrears seriously by using a risk adjustment term that translates
into a higher effective foreign interest rate when net foreign assets, modelled as foreign
debt, are above their non-stochastic steady state (NSS) level (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2002), Christiano et al. (2011)).
The non-accumulation of domestic private and public payment arrears is the other
pillar of the multilateral surveillance. In the model economy, we account for govern-
ment arrears payments delays indirectly. We use a government flow budget constraint
5 Amongst FZC, Chad and Gabon have no government revenue data while others have at best ten data
points between 1979 and 2018 (World Development Indicator database).
6 Through the years, monetary policy in the Franc Zone must have been relying on some form of guess-
work or calibration too.
7 Obviously, the implementation of administered price in those countries dampens down nationwide infla-
tionary pressure indicator but may also biases it. For instance, the prices of fuels, cement, and power
are set by the Cameroon’s government.
8 The peak years for the ratio of external payments are as follows: Chad (6% in 1987), Gabon (15%
in 1993), Cameroon (6% in 1996), Congo (73% and 75% in 1998 and 2003 respectively) and Central African
Republic (18% in 2005) (Computed using data from World Development Indicators).
9 The ratio is the number of times where there is a positive difference between two consecutive years
of external arrears repayments divided by 40. The computed figures are as follows: Cameroon 65%, Central
African Republic 50%, Chad 53%, Congo 58% and Gabon 58%. For instance, in Gabon, a positive difference
has been computed 23 times (data extracted from World Development Indicators).
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which binds at each period and where the monetary finance of budget deficit is set at
the mid-range of the statutory bracket. Therefore, government debt increase is held in
check given a lump-sum tax rate that is set at its average value.
The non-accumulation of domestic private payment arrears is dealt with by sub-
jecting private borrowers to a borrowing collateral constraint that has a high cost of
repossession in case of default. Moreover, the borrowing collateral constraint is always
binding in the NSS as in Iacoviello (2005).
The financial sector is dominated by banks in the CEMAC. Yet, the long-standing
excess liquidity in the banking sector shows that there is a pervasive fear of lending
to the private sector among CEMAC’s banks. For instance, the excess liquidity of the
banking sector represented 12% of their balance sheet in 2016 and 2.2% of CEMAC
Gross Domestic Product in 2019. Both figures are deemed to be too high by the IMF
(2016, 2019b). In Cameroon, the causes of fear of lending include an improper ac-
counting and bookkeeping practices in the corporate sector, a weak legal systems, and
an expensive and cumbersome registration of collateral. Those factors are exacerbated
by banks’ foreseen fear to have difficulty refinancing at the BEAC because their eligi-
ble collateral are low and the quantity of outstanding government bonds limited (IMF
(2005, 2016, 2019b)). Interestingly, Gerali et al. (2010) set forth a way to assess the
role of credit-supply factors in business cycle fluctuations. Arguably, that framework
is not meant to encompass all those fear of lending factors. However, since CEMAC
banks’ primary resources are deposits and their bottom line is shared almost equally
between fees and interest rate spread (IMF (2016)), accounting for interest rate adjust-
ment costs in an otherwise classic spread optimization problem helps to factor in other
fees.
The inadequacy of financial inclusion is well established in the CEMAC. For ex-
ample, in 2017, out of an average of the 31% of the population declaring having an
account with a financial institution in the CEMAC, 5.8% succeeded in borrowing from
those institutions or used a credit card, compared respectively to 43% and 8% for Sub-
Saharan Africa. More importantly, 62.27% of the CEMAC population declared being
unable to come up with emergency funds10. In our model, we accommodate for the
inadequate financial inclusion by considering three types of private economic agents: -
an optimizing household who has access to saving deposits, can trade in one physical
asset (land or real estate) but cannot take out a loan from banks - an optimizing entre-
preneur who can take out a loan to finance consumption or investment - an optimizing
household who do not have access to and cannot trade in financial or physical assets.
She/He can still smooth her/his consumption by adjusting her/his holdings of money
as in Coenen et al (2007). For convenience only, the latter is dubbed the rule-of-thumb
household11.
For decades, FZ’s monetary authorities have been relying on country-specific an-
nual data to devise monetary policy because of the dearth of high frequency data and
poor economic integration among its members (Masson and Patillo (2005)). We yield
10 CEMAC’s average computed from World Bank’s FINDEX 2018 data (population age 16+ years).
11 The rule-of-thumb household is perhaps a misnomer because the original Campbell-Mankiw (1989)
rule-of-thumb household consumes all his/her disposable income (See the justification of our assumption
below).
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to that constraint and use Cameroon’s annual data to estimate the model economy.
One of the findings of the paper is that fiscal policy does matter but through its effect
on banks’ balance sheet in a typical FZ model economy where the ratio of rule-of-
thumb households, a bank supply side, and a binding collateral constraint are modelled.
The paper is organized as follows: The model is outlined in the second section and
then estimated in the third section. Estimation results are commented in the fourth
section. The fifth section concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The small country produces a homogenous good using intermediate goods purchased
from monopolist producers12. The homogenous good is consumed at home or exported
overseas at world prices after repackaging. Intermediate monopolist producers use la-
bor, capital service and land to produce a variety of goods whose prices are set accord-
ing to a Calvo-pricing mechanism13. Importers repackage a foreign homogenous good
that is either used as a consumption or an investment good. Banks receive deposits
from households and use them to build up reserves, purchase government bonds and
extend loans to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can take out loans from domestic and
foreign banks to finance a fraction of their acquisition of land (or real estate), physical
capital, and consumption goods.
2.1 The production of the final homogenous good
The competitive producer of the domestic homogenous good ,Yt, combines intermedi-
ate goods of monopolist producers using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator production func-
tion
Yt =
 1
0
Y
θ−1
θ
j,t dj
 θ
θ−1
θ > 1 (1)
where θ is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of domestic good
and λd ≡ θ/(θ − 1) the markup parameter in the domestic goods market. Profit max-
imization subject to the given prices of intermediate goods, Pj,t, and the market price
of the final good, Pt, gives the equilibrium demand for each j intermediate good, Yj,t,
and the domestic good’s price
Yj,t =

Pj,t
Pt
−θ
Yt (2)
Pt =
 1
0
(Pj,t)
1−θ dj
 1
1−θ
(3)
12 The DSGE model of a small open economy has been described in numerous papers. See for example
Christiano et al. (2011) and Adolfson et al. (2007) among others.
13 In their DSGE model for Mozambique, Peiris and Saxegaard (2007) use a Rotemberg-type quadratic
adjustment costs for price setting. Both nominal rigidity procedures are equivalent.
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2.2 The production of intermediate goods
There is a continuum of j intermediate producers in the economy. The jth intermediate
firm combines aggregate labor, lj,t, capital service, Kj,t, and land (or real estate), Hej,t,
to produce, Yj,t.
Yj,t = ε
y
t (Kj,t)
µ Hej,tϑ [ztlj,t]1−µ−ϑ − φzt (4)
where zt is the permanent technology shock whose rate of growth is µz,t = zt/zt−1,
εyt a covariance stationary transitory technology shock and φ a fixed cost of production.
The total cost of production of the intermediate good producer j is given by
Wtlj,t +R
k
tKj,t + r
h
tQt−1H
e
j,t (5)
The stationarized first order conditions (FOCs) for the representative intermediate
producer’s cost minimization problem with respect to labor, capital and real estate ser-
vices are given by
wt = ε
y
t (1− µ− ϑ)mct

1
µzt
µ+ϑ
wt
rkt
µ 
(1− µ− ϑ)
(µzt )µ
−µ
wt
qt−1
ϑ 
(1− µ− ϑ)
ϑ
rht
(πtµzt )
−ϑ
(6)
rkt = µ (µ
z
tmct)
yt
kt
(7)
qt−1 =
ϑ (πtµztmct)
rht
yt
het
(8)
where πt ≡ PtPt−1 ,mct ≡
MCt
Pt
, rkt ≡
Rkt
Pt
, qt ≡
Qt
Pt
and rht are the inflation rate
of the domestic good, the real marginal cost, the real rental rate of capital services, the
real price, and the rental rate of land (or real estate) respectively14.
After choosing the optimal combination of labor, capital, and land services, inter-
mediate firms set the price of their goods in a Calvo-type friction environment: Firms
that receive the green light to change their price choose the optimum price with a prob-
ability (1− ξ) and firms that are not allowed to optimize their price in the current
period adjust the previous period’s price by a factor which is a combination of the
Central Bank’s target inflation, πct , and the previous period’s inflation, πt−1.
Pt = (πt−1)
κd (πct)
1−κd Pt−1 (9)
where κd is the price indexation parameter. There is a random probability ξ that a
firm sets Pt at period t.
14 Stationarized variables are obtain as follows: Nominal variables are divided by ztPt. Real flow and stock
variables are scaled by zt and zt−1 respectively.The low caps are used for stationarized variables.
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2.3 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived households indexed by i
on [0, 1]. A proportion (1− λ) of households can purchase real estate and make de-
posits at banks. The other fraction of households λ can only carry cash from one period
to the other to smooth her/his consumption. The presence of two types of households
was suggested by Mankiw (2000) in order to make theoretical models’ predictions
consistent with the observed strong dependence of consumption on current income,
in contrast to the prediction of the permanent income hypothesis. Galí et al. (2007)
pioneered the integration of both types of households with a calibrated DSGE model.
2.3.1 Household with access to land and bank deposits (Type I households)
The expected lifetime utility function of the ith household is
E0
t=∞
t=0
(βa)
t
 εct (1− κa) log(Cai,t − κaCai,t−1)− AaL1+σL lai,t1+σL
+ja log

Hat+1

+ εmt
Aq
1−σq

Mai,t+1
ztPt
1−σq

where E0 is the conditional expectation operator, Caj,t an aggregate consumption
index, lai,t the level of hours worked, Hat+1 the stock of real estate, Mai,t the nomi-
nal cash holdings, βa the consumer subjective discount factor, 1/σL the Frisch labor
supply elasticity , and 1/σq the interest elasticity of demand for real cash balances.
A degree of habit persistence in consumption, κa, is assumed. The demand for real
money balances shock εmt and the consumption preference shock , εct , follow AR(1)
processes. There are three positive scaling parameters AaL, ja, and Aq in the utility
function.
The household’s budget constraint is given by
1 + rdt

Dai,t+W tl
a
i,t+M
a
i,t= P
c
tC
a
i,t+T
a
i,t+M
a
i,t+1+D
a
i,t+1+Qt

1− S Hat+1−Hat
Hat −H
a
t−1
 
Hat+1 −H
a
t

where rdt is the domestic deposit interest rate, Dai,t the bank deposits and Tai,t the
lump tax. The last term on the right hand side of the equation is the new investment
in land less transaction cost. The transaction cost functions are zero in the NSS i.e.S (µz) = S′ (µz) = 0. The FOCs with respect to money, deposits, consumption, labor
and land (or real estate) for the representative household are given by
−mat+1 +
1
εmt

1
Aq
−1
σq

ψaz,t − βa
ψaz,t+1
πt+1µzt+1
−1
σq
= 0 (10)
−ψaz,t + βa

1 + rdt+1
 ψaz,t+1
πt+1µzt+1
= 0 (11)
εct
 1
cat − κa
cat−1
µz,t
− βaεct+1 κaµz,t+1cat+1 − κacat

− ψaz,tp
c
t = 0 (12)
−AaL (l
a
t )
σL + ψaz,twt = 0 (13) (13)
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ja
hat+1
− ψaz,tqt

1− St −Θ1 S′t+ βaψaz,t+1µzt+1 qt+1

1− St+1 +Θ2 S′t+1 = 0 (14)
where
Θ1 ≡
µzt−1

µzth
a
t − h
a
t−1

µzt−1h
a
t−1 − h
a
t−2
Θ2 ≡

µzt

µzt+1h
a
t+1 − h
a
t

µzth
a
t − h
a
t−1
 hat−1 − µztµzt+1hat+1
µzth
a
t − h
a
t−1

ψaz,t
zt
≡ νatPt is the stationarized shadow value of one unit of the domestic homoge-
nous good to the household and νat is the Lagrange multiplier.
2.3.2 Households with no access to real estate and bank deposits (Type II
households)
In the theoretical literature, factors such as fear of saving, myopia or the ignorance of
saving opportunities have been set forth as the rationale for non-optimizing behavior
by rule-of-thumb households (Galí et al. (2007), Mankiw (2000)). Those factors may
be invoked here too. However, we stress that the assumption that a fraction λ of house-
holds do not have access to financial and physical assets also results from poverty and
the inadequacy of financial inclusion. Therefore, we are replacing the typical rule-of-
thumb household by a cash optimizing household because we are going to estimate the
model using Cameroon’s data, a country where Njanguis offer a short term savings and
loans "cash instruments.15"
The ith Type II household maximizes her/his lifetime utility
E0
t=∞
t=0
(βna)
t

εct (1− κ
na) log(Cnai,t − κnaC
na
i,t−1)−
AnaL
1+σL

lnai,t
1+σL + εmt Aq1−σq Mnai,t+1ztPt 1−σq
subject to her/his budget constraint
Wtl
na
i,t − P
c
t C
na
i,t − T
na
i,t −M
na
i,t+1 +M
na
i,t = 0
The representative Type II household’s FOCs with respect to consumption, labor
and cash are given by
εct
cnat − κna
cnat−1
µzt
−
κnaβnaε
c
t+1
µz,t+1c
na
t+1 − κnac
na
t
− ψnaz,tp
c
t = 0 (15)
−AnaL (l
na
t )
σL + ψnaz,twt = 0 (16)
mnat+1 −
1
εmt

1
Aq
 1
−σq

ψnaz,t − βna
ψnaz,t+1
πt+1µz,t+1
 1
−σq
= 0 (17)
where ψnaz,t ≡ νnat Ptzt and νnat is the Lagrange multiplier.
15 According to Cameroon’s pidgin English, a Njangui describes a group of persons sharing common
ties—region, tribe, friendship, colleagues—who decide to meet on a regular basis to assemble their savings to
provide financial solutions to their members or community (IMF (2018)).
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2.4 Entrepreneurs
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived entrepreneurs indexed by
j on [0, 1]. Entrepreneurs own physical capital and a fraction of land (or real estate).
They rent their stock of land to intermediate firms. They choose the level of capital
service they rent to intermediate firms by choosing the utilization rate of capital for a
given stock of capital or by increasing the stock of capital for a given utilization rate.
They also choose the level of investment to increase the stock of physical capital. In
addition to the wage and rents they receive from intermediate firms, entrepreneurs can
borrow abroad or from local banks to purchase land, physical capital and consumption
goods. Following, Bernanke et al. (1999), entrepreneur labor is inelastically supplied
and set to one unit.
For the jth entrepreneur, what matters is the difference between his current and
lagged consumption. His lifetime utility function is given by
E0
∞
t=0
(βe)
t log(Cej,t − κeC
e
j,t−1)
The jth entrepreneur’s budget constraint is given by
Rkt uj,tKj,t+r
h
tQtH
e
j,t+B
e
j,t+1+R
∗
t−1Φt−1St−1B
e∗
j,t+W
ele = P ct C
e
j,t+P
i
t Ij,t+
P it a (uj,t)Kj,t+PtP
k′
t ∆t+

1 + St (·)Qt Hej,t+1 −Hej,t+StBe∗j,t+1+Rbet Bej,t+
T oilj,t
where Rbet and R∗t−1 are the gross domestic and foreign borrowing interest rates
respectively, Be∗j,t net foreign assets (NFA), T oilj,t the lump-sum tax, St−1 the nominal
exchange rate, uj,t the level of capital utilization, Rkt the rate of return on a unit of
physical capital, and Pk′t the price of installed capital. The resource cost of capital
utilization measured in units of physical capital is defined as in Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004)
a (uj,t) = σa (uj,t − 1) +
σb
2
(uj,t − 1)
2
, σa, σb > 0 (18)
The risk adjustment term on NFA that ensures a well-behaved steady state equilib-
rium is given by
Φj,t = exp

−φ˜b

B∗j,t −B
∗

− φ˜s

R∗t −R
d
t

−

R∗ −Rd

+ φ˜
u
t

φ˜b, φ˜s > 0
(19)
where φ˜ut is an AR(1) process, B∗, R∗ and Rd the NSS values of the corresponding
variables16. The response to a deviation of NFA from its NSS value precludes a Ponzi-
type steady state equilibrium. The interest rate differential accounts for free capital
mobility between FZC and France and the fact that the CFAF is pegged to a floating
currency. Therefore, that interest rate differential should be considered as a proxy of
France’s uncovered interest rate parity which is transmitted to FZC.
The law of motion of physical stock is given by
16 The form of the risk adjustment term used here is discussed in Christiano et al. (2011).
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Kj,t+1 = (1− δ)Kj,t+

1− S Ij,t
Ij,t−1

Ij,t+∆j,t S (1)=S′ (1) = 0,S” (1) > 0
(20)
where the second term is the technology that transforms investment, It, into physi-
cal capital, δ the depreciation rate of capital, and ∆j,t the physical capital purchased in
competitive market from other firms (Christiano et al. (2001)).
Banks can repossess an entrepreneur’s real estate if she/he defaults on her/his loan
after paying a fraction (1−̟h) of the real estate’s value. We do not deal with agency
problem because real estate (or land) is used as collateral for domestic lending. Fol-
lowing Iacoviello (2005), we assume that the domestic borrowing constraint is al-
ways binding in NSS because entrepreneurs are more patient than Type I households
(βe < βa) and the return on real estate is bigger than the nominal interest rate on loan.
Rbet B
e
j,t −̟hQt+1H
e
j,t+1 = 0 (21)
Dropping the j’s indexes to consider the representative entrepreneur, the FOCs with
respect to investment, physical capital, capital utilization rate, domestic bank loan,
foreign assets and land in stationarized form are given by
µzt
µzt c
e
t − κec
e
t−1
1
pct

−pit + P
k′
t

1− St − µzt it
it−1
S′t+ βe

µzt+1it+1
it
2
P k
′
t+1
pct+1

µzt+1c
e
t+1 − κec
e
t
 S′t+1 = 0
(22)
µzt+1βe
µzt+1c
e
t+1 − κec
e
t
Rkt+1
pct+1
µzt+1
πt+1
−
1
pct

µztµ
z
t+1
µzt c
e
t − κec
e
t−1

= 0 (23)
rkt = a
′ (ut) p
i
t (24)
πt+1µ
z
tµ
z
t+1
pct

µzt c
e
t − κec
e
t−1
 − βe 1 + ret+1  1pct+1 µ
z
t+1
µzt+1c
e
t+1 − κec
e
t
+ ψez,t+1

= 0 (25)
ψet − βe
ψet+1
πt+1
R∗tΦt
µzt+1
= 0 (26)
−
qt
pct
µzt
µzt c
e
t − κec
e
t−1

1 +Θ3 St′ + St (27)
+βe
qt+1
pct+1
1
µzt+1c
e
t+1 − κec
e
t

1−Θ4 S′t+1 + St+1 + rht+1
+̟hψ
e
z,tqt+1πt+1 = 0
where
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Θ3 =
µzt−1

µzth
e
t+1 − h
e
t

µzt−1h
e
t − h
e
t−1
Θ4 =
µzt

µzt+1h
e
t+2 − h
e
t+1

µzth
e
t+1 − h
e
t
 het − µztµzt+1het+2
µzth
e
t+1 − h
e
t
where ψet ≡ (υetPt) zt and υet is the shadow value of domestic currency in utility
terms to the entrepreneur.
2.5 Banks
In order to account for credit-supply factors in business cycle dynamics, we choose the
framework in Gerali et al. (2010). They conceive financial intermediation at banks as a
three-step process involving at each step one branch of the bank, namely the wholesale
branch, the loan branch, or the deposit branch. In a nutshell, once households place
deposits with the deposit branch, it deposits them in the wholesale branch which trans-
forms them into a loan to the lending branch. The latter transforms and lends that loan
to firms and to the government. Profit maximization at each branch contributes to the
aggregate profit of the bank17.
2.5.1 The wholesale branch
The wholesale branch has a capital Kbt whose law of motion is given by
Kbt = (1− δbk)K
b
t +Π
bk
t (28)
where δbk is the rate of depreciation and Πbkt the amount of profits.
First, the wholesale branch combines (on the liability side) bank capital Kbt and
wholesale deposits received from the deposit branchDat to issue a wholesale loanBt =
Bet + B
g
t (on the asset side). Any deviation from its capital to asset ratio target νb
entails a cost that is parametrized by κKb. The wholesale branch chooses Bt and Dat
to maximizes its profit
max{Bt,Dat } r
b
tBt − rt (1− λres)D
a
t −
κKb
2

Kbt
Bt
− νb
2
Kbt = 0
where rbt and rt are the wholesale loan and deposit rate respectively and λres the
reserves to deposit ratio. The deposit branch’s reserves do not earn interest. The sta-
tionarized FOC with respect to Bt is given by
rbt = (1− λres) rt − κKb

kbt
bt
− νb

kbt
bt
2
(29)
2.5.2 The loan branch
The loan branch gets a wholesale loan Bt from the wholesale branch that carries an
interest rate rbt , differentiates it at no cost and then lends it to entrepreneurs and the
17 Here, we only sketch the framework in Gerali et al (2016). The interested reader should see their
paper for a discussion of the assumptions and the derivation of FOCs.
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government. The loan branch faces a quadratic adjustment cost for changing loan
interest rates. The problem for the jth loan branch is to
Max{rbej,t,r
bg
j,t}
E0
∞
t=0
(βa)
t
 rbej,tBej,t + rbgj,tBgj,t − rbj,t

Bej,t +B
g
j,t

−κbe
2

rbej,t
rbej,t−1
− 1
2
rbej,tB
e
j,t −
κbg
2

r
bg
j,t
r
bg
j,t−1
− 1
2
rbgj,tB
g
j,t

subject to the demand for loans by entrepreneurs and the government, Bgt .
Bej,t =

rbej,t
rbet
−ηbe
Bet and B
g
j,t =

r
bg
j,t
r
g
t
−ηbg
Bgt
where ηbe and ηbg are the demand elasticities of entrepreneurs and government
loans and Bet the aggregate loan to entrepreneurs.
The stationarized FOCs of the representative loan branch with respect to rbej,t and
rbgj,t in a symmetric equilibrium are
1− ηbe+ηbe
rbt
rbet
−κbe

rbet
rbet−1
− 1

rbet
rbet−1
+βa
ψaz,t+1
ψaz,t
κbe

rbet+1
rbet
− 1

rbet+1
rbet
2
bet+1
bet
µztπt
µzt+1πt+1
= 0
(30)
1− ηbg+ηbg
rbt
rbet
−κbg

rbgt
rbgt−1
− 1

rbgt
rbgt−1
+βa
ψaz,t+1
ψaz,t
κbg

rbgt+1
rbgt
− 1

rbgt+1
rbgt
2
bgt+1
bgt
µztπt
µzt+1πt+1
= 0
(31)
2.5.3 The deposit branch
The jth deposit branch collects deposits, Daj,t, from households with access to financial
assets (Type I) and then deposits them in the wholesale unit. The wholesale unit pays
an interest rate, rt, on those deposits while the deposit branch pays rdj,t on households’
deposits. It is costly to change the interest rate on households’ deposits. The deposit
branch problem is to choose, rdj,t, to maximize its profit by solving
Max{rdj,t}
E0
∞
t=0
(βa)
t

rt (1− λres)D
a
j,t − r
d
j,tD
a
j,t −
κd
2

rdj,t
rdj,t−1
− 1
2
rdtDt

subject to
Daj,t =

rdj,t
rdt
−ηd
Dt
In a symmetric equilibrium, the stationarized FOC for the representative deposit
branch is
ηd−
ηd (1− λres) rt
rdt
−1− κd

rdt
rdt−1
− 1

rdt
rdt−1
+βa
ψat+1
ψat
πtµ
z
t
µzt+1πt+1
κd

rdt+1
rdt
− 1

rdt+1
rdt
2
dt+1
dt
= 0
(32)
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2.6 The government
According to the FZ Agreement (up to end-2017), for any given year, each government
is entitled to obtain from the BEAC up to 20% of taxes collected in the previous year
as a monetary finance of its budget deficit18. Here, we keep that monetary financing
rule because it applies in our estimation period and also because the new rule is still to
be successfully implemented19.
By the way, it would be straightforward to adapt the present model to accommodate
the substitution of a statutory monetary finance of government’s deficit by the BEAC
with a monetary finance of that deficit through market auction.
Here, government resources come from new interest-bearing debt, new cash injec-
tion from the Central Bank, and a lump-sum tax, Tt, levied on households and entre-
preneurs. Those resources are used to consume domestically produced goods, Gt, and
service government debt, Bbkg,t. Thus, the government’s flow constraint may be written
as
Bbkg,t+1 = Gt +

1 + rbgt

Bbkg,t − λT
na
i,t − (1− λ)T
a
i,t − T
e
i,t − λ
FZTt−1 (33)
where λFZ the CEMAC’s monetary finance of budget deficit parameter. Public
spending and lump-sum tax are AR(1) processes.
T τt = ξ
T
t (λτY )
1−ρT

T τt−1
ρT (34)
Gt = ξ
T
t (λgY )
1−ρG (Gt−1)
ρG (35)
where λτ = λa, λna, or λe are lump-sum tax ratios (Type I, II households and
entrepreneurs respectively) and λg the expenditures ratio.
2.7 The Central Bank
The FZ mechanism requires each CEMAC country transfer at least 50% of its foreign
exchange reserves to a special French Treasury account named Compte d’Opérations
(no less than 65% before 2007) and entrust the BEAC with the balance. The ratio-
nale for pooling foreign exchange reserves in a monetary union is well documented.
Nevertheless, several member states are reluctant to entrust the BEAC with reserves
that are not earmarked for CEMAC pooling arrangement (IMF (2013)). We omit that
breakdown of foreign exchange reserves in our model because data are unavailable.
Setting capital gain on foreign exchange reserves to zero, the quasi-fiscal surplus,
SCBKt , of the Central Bank is given by
18 In the new monetary framework, member States must seek liquidity on a competitive market where the
minimum rate is equal to the BEAC’s policy rate and the maximum amount raised consistent with the regional
international reserves targets. Monetary programming would be abandoned (IMF (2017b)).
19 One of the long-standing problems with CEMAC governments is the squandering and embezzlement
of taxes, natural resources rents and foreign aid. For instance, the IMF (2018) points out "Access to finance"
as the second most problematic factor to doing business after "Corruption" in Cameroon.
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SCBKt = St∆CBXRt+1 −∆MBt+1 (36)
where CBXRt is the country’s foreign exchange reserves at the Central Bank,
MBt the monetary base which is the sum of currency held by households, Mt, and
reserves held by the banking sector in the vaults of the Central Bank, Rbkt . The flow
constraint pertaining to the country is obtained by equalizing the quasi-fiscal surplus to
difference between Central Bank’s "expenditures" and earnings (Agenor and Montiel
(1996)). Here, it is given by
StCBXRt+1−St−1CBXRt−∆MBt+1= i
∗FZ
t−1 St−1CBXRt−λ
FZ

λTnai,t−1 − (1− λ)T
a
i,t−1 − T
e
i,t−1

(37)
where i∗FZt−1 is the interest rate received on foreign exchange reserves, whose gross
value, R∗FZt , is assumed to follow an AR(1)20.
2.8 Aggregation
The aggregate consumption bundle is a CES function of domestic (Cdt ) and imported
consumption goods (Cmt ).
Ct =

(1− ωc)
1
ηc

Cdt
 (ηc−1)
ηc + ω
1
ηc
c (C
m
t )
(ηc−1)
ηc
 ηc
(ηc−1) (38)
where ωc is the share of imports in consumption and ηc the elasticity of substitu-
tion between domestic and foreign good. The price of the three consumption goods
P ct , Pt and Pmt , are given to the households, the domestic producers and importers
respectively. Competitive importing firms produce the imported good by transforming
one-for-one the homogenous foreign good. The domestic currency price of the ho-
mogenous foreign good is given by Pmt = StP ∗t , where P∗t is the foreign currency
price of the homogenous good. The FOCs give the stationarized demand for the do-
mestically produced and imported consumption goods (cdt and cmt )
cmt = ωc (q
e
t )
−ηc ct (39)
cdt = (1− ωc)

1
pct
−ηc
ct (40)
where qet ≡
StP
∗
t
Pct
is the real exchange rate, St the nominal exchange rate. The
relative price of the consumption good is given by
pct =

(1− ωc) + ωc ∗ (p
m
t )
1−ηc
 1
1−ηc (41)
where the relative price of the imported consumption good is defined by pmt ≡ qet pct .
The consumer inflation index computed from (41) is
20 A sample of interest rates applicable to different deposit brackets is provided in Veyrune (2007)
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πct ≡ πt

(1− ωc) + ωc ∗ (p
m
t )
1−ηc
(1− ωc) + ωc ∗

pmt−1
1−ηc
 1
1−ηc
(42)
A representative competitive firm produces the aggregate investment good using
the domestically produced homogenous good and imported investment good.
Likewise, the FOCs for a CES investment bundle given P it , Pt and Pmt gives the
demand for the stationarized domestically produced and imported investment goods (idt
and imt )
imt = ωi (q
e
t )
−ηi it (43)
idt = (1− ωi)

1
pit
−ηi
it (44)
where the investment price index pit is given by
pit =

(1− ωi) + ωi ∗ (q
e
t p
c
t)
1−ηi
 1
1−ηi (45)
and the investment inflation index by
πit ≡ πt

(1− ωi) + ωi ∗ (q
e
t p
c
t)
1−ηi
(1− ωi) + ωi ∗

qet−1p
c
t−1
1−ηi
 1
1−ηi
(46)
2.9 Resource constraints
The model is closed by the equilibria of the balance of payments, the domestic good
market, and the land market.
Land stock, h, is fixed and normalized to 1. Each period, the sum of land holdings
of the entrepreneurs and Type I households is equal to h in equilibrium.
The domestically produced good is transformed one for one by exporters. There-
fore, the domestic good market equilibrium in stationarized form is given by
yt = (1− ωc)

1
pct
−ηc
[(1− λ) cat + λc
na
t + c
e
t ] (47)
+gt + (1− ωi)

1
pit
−ηi
it + a (uj,t)
kj,t
µzt
+

1
pctqt
−ηx
y∗t
where y∗t is the foreign output, ηx the export elasticity with respect to the relative
price of exports.
The change in the country’s foreign exchange reserves at the Central Bank equals
net capital flows from abroad
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St∆CBXRt+1 =

qet p
c
tC
m
t + q
e
t p
c
tI
m
t + StB
∗
t+1
 (48)
−

1
qet p
c
t
−ηx
Y ∗t + i
∗FZ
t−1 St−1CBXRt +

1 + r∗t−1

Φt−1St−1B
∗
t

2.10 Shocks
Seventeen stochastic exogenous variables are included in the model. There are two
technology shocks: a neutral technology stationary shock, εyt , and a labor neutral tech-
nology shock, zt, whose growth rate shock, εµzt , is a first order autoregression process,
AR(1). Land supply shock, εht , and bank profit shock, εΠ
bk
t , also affect the supply side
of the model economy. Since entrepreneurs’ labor is exogenous and normalized to
one, their wage rate shock is added for convenience. On the demand side, there is a
consumption preference shock, εct , and a demand for real money balances shock, εmt .
A government spending shock, εGt , and three lump-sum tax shocks are included -one
on each type of household, εTat and εT
na
t , and one on the entrepreneurs, εT
oil
t . Shocks
related to monetary policy include the inflation target shock, επct , the interest rate on
foreign reserves shock, εR∗FZt , the nominal exchange rate shock, εst , and the bank re-
serves shock, εbkrt . A foreign inflation shock, επ
∗
t , and a risk term shock, ε
φ
u
t , complete
the set of exogenous stochastic variables. In the model, all shocks are defined by AR(1)
processes
ειt = ξ
ι
t (ε
ι)
1−ρει

ειt−1
ρει (49)
where ειt denotes any of the above shocks, ρει its persistence, and ξιt its related
covariance stationary component. The prior distributions are given in Table 1.
3 Estimation of the model
The model is estimated using Bayesian technique. First, a stationarized log-linear ver-
sion of the model is computed and then it is used to find its log-linear approximation
in the non-stochastic steady state’s neighborhood.
3.1 Data
We estimate the model economy using Cameroon’s annual data over 1979-2016. The
observable time series are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), foreign exchange re-
serves, claims on the private sector by banks, physical capital stock, bank deposits,
consumer price inflation, deposit interest rate, investment in physical capital, forest
rent as a proxy for lump-sum tax on rule-of-thumb households, oil rents as a proxy for
lump-sum tax on entrepreneur, West Texas Intermediate price change as a proxy for
foreign inflation and a proxy for risk free international interest rate21.
21 WTI prices are extracted from Macrotrends.net. The stock of capital is extracted from Penn World
Tables (Feenstra et al. (2015). Claims on the private sector comes from the World Bank (2018). Money
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The change in oil price is used as a proxy for foreign inflation because the share
of oil and petroleum products imports is sizeable and the country is a price-taker on
international markets of those goods.
For the proxy for lump-tax on entrepreneurs, we note that all companies file and
pay taxes. However, extractive industries in general - and oil exploitation companies in
particular - are both the main taxpayers and capital intensive producers in the country.
They operate throughout the production chain and sell their output in world markets.
The government collects a fraction of the sales. Therefore, we use the oil rents as a
proxy for lump-sum tax on entrepreneurs because its amount is sizeable and affects the
tax levied on other smaller companies.
The proxy for the lump-sum tax on rule-of-thumb consumers is perhaps less ob-
vious and needs to be put into context. The ONCPB(Office National de Commercial-
isation des Produits de Base) was created in 1978 and dismantled in 1994/95 after
three consecutive reforms (1989/90, 1991 and 1994/95). During its existence, that
state-owned Marketing Board of cash crops indirectly levied export taxes on crop pro-
ducers by taxing sales made by authorized private traders and by pocketing the revenue
of sales made directly by ONCPB’s agents22. Since 1995, licensed exporters have
been tasked with buying crops from local producers for exportation. Because of the
long-standing monopolistic structure of the cash crops local market, licensed exporters
have been able to pass on taxes to local producers23. Therefore, the gap between lo-
cal and world market price of one of the main cash crops could be used as a proxy for
lump-tax on rule-of-thumb households since farming is the main activity of low-income
households24 and is still the principal source of revenue for 56.1% of the population
in 201725. Unfortunately, local crops price data are missing between 2001 and 2004,
and after 2010 in the dataset provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO
(2020)). Therefore, we use forest rent data as the proxy.
3.2 Fixed parameters
Parameters that cannot be identified are fixed (Table 1). The adjustment cost on deposit
interest rate κd is high to reflect the extremely low variability of deposit interest rate in
the data. The demand elasticity of exports, ηx, the reserves to deposits ratio, λres, the
rate of depreciation of capital, δ, the parameter controlling the deviation of net foreign
assets from its equilibrium value, φ˜b, the capital utilization cost parameters, σa, and
σb, are from Nana-Davies (2018). The land and capital service shares in output are
respectively set to ϑ = 0.04 and µ = 0.42, implying a labor share of 0.54. The
inverse of the Frisch elasticity σL is set to 1. The demand elasticity of deposit, ηd,
the adjustment cost parameter of banks’ wholesale branch, κKb, and lending branch,
κbe, are from Gerali et al. (2010). Given the average growth and the average consumer
is extracted from International Financial Statistics. All other series are retrieved from the World Development
Indicators database (The World Bank).
22 See World Bank (1986), Shepherd and Farolfi (1999), and Konings (2010).
23 For example, it is still true that 6 of 193 licensed cocoa exporters provide 80% of exports as noted
in Shepherd and Farolfi (1999).
24 Lynch (1991) finds that the majority of Cameroon’s poor households, approximately 80 percent of the
lowest quintiles, live in the rural areas.
25 See World Food Programme (2017).
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price inflation found in the in the data, the subjective discount factors, βa, and βe, are
set to match the domestic and foreign interest rates averages found in the data. The
monetary finance of government deficit as a percentage of tax revenues of the previous
year, λFZ , is set to the median value of its statutory range. The fraction of asset that
can be recovered in case of default, ̟h, is low because of the long-standing difficulty
to collect debt and enforce mortgages as noted for example by the IMF (2009). The
government expenditure to GDP ratio λg is set to the average value computed from
available years of data.
The share of households who do not have access to deposits and land market λ
cannot be identified with our observed data. Interestingly, Galí et al. (2007) found
that the existence of a unique equilibrium (or an indeterminacy) is linked to the degree
of price stickiness and the weight of rule-of-thumb households in a calibrated model
economy. Having successfully identified the degree of price stickiness in our model, we
take our cue from one piece of information to start the search for a sensible value of λ.
First, from 1996 to 2014, the World Bank (2019) estimates that the poverty headcount
ratio range is between 44.7% and 73.8% of the population. Second, using a few years
of available data, the computed average government revenues to GDP ratio is equal
to 0.11. Third, setting an equal value for λa and λe, and a lower value for λna, we
test different combinations to find the rule-of-thumb households ratio that is included
in the World Bank’s range of 0.44 - 0.74, that guarantees the revenues ratio of 0.11,
and that ensures the existence of a unique NSS of the model economy. We find that
given an average government revenues to GDP ratio of 0.11, a unique NSS exist for the
combination of a rule-of-thumb ratio λ = 0.48 and fiscal parameters λa = λe = 0.06
and λna = 0.04. Interestingly, the IMF (2018) reports that 47% of respondent do not
have a bank account by lack of money in the 2014 Findex survey. Because the value of
λ that ensures the existence of a NSS is in the World Bank’s range and is very close to
the Findex survey’s value, we gain some confidence about all our fixed parameters and
our priors before turning to the estimation of identified parameters.
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Table 1: Fixed parameters
Parameter Value Description
AaL 2 Scaling of disutility of work (Type I household)
AnaL 2.5 Scaling of disutility of work (Type II household)
Aq 0.75 Scaling of utility of cash
βa 0.97 Subjective discount factor (Type I household)
βe 0.9 Entrepreneur’s subjective discount factor
βna 0.98 Subjective discount factor (Type II household)
δ 0.05 Depreciation rate of physical capital
ηbg 2.79 Demand elasticity of public loan
ηd −1.5 Demand elasticity of deposits
ηx 1.5 Demand elasticity of exports
ja 0.01 Scaling of disutility of land (Type I household)
κbe 3 Adjustment cost parameter interest rate for entrepreneur loan
κbg 5 Adjustment cost parameter interest rate for government loan
κKb 10 Adjustment cost parameter capital to asset ratio
κd 50 Adjustment cost parameter interest rate on deposits
λ 0.48 Share of Type II households
λFZ 0.1 Monetary finance of government parameter
µ 0.42 Capital service share in production
̟h 0.01 Fraction of land recovered in case of default
λres 0.1 Reserves to deposits ratio
σL 1 Inverse of the Frisch elasticity
σa 0.058 Capital utilization cost parameter
σb 0.009 Capital utilization cost parameter
ϑ 0.04 Land service share in production
φ˜b 0.01 Parameter on NFA in Risk adjustment term
λa 0.06 Lump-sum tax ratio (Type I households)
λg 0.12 Gov. expenditure to GDP ratio
λna 0.04 Lump-sum tax ratio (Type II households)
λe 0.06 Lump-sum tax ratio (Entrepreneurs)
3.3 Empirical results
Table 2a and 2b show the priors and posteriors of estimated parameters. The distribu-
tions of our priors rely on theory. The Inverse Gamma distribution is used for the law
of motion of positive parameters. Parameters whose values are expected to fall in range
between 0 and 1 are assumed to follow a Beta distribution. A Gamma distribution is
used for positive or nil parameters26.
The values of autocorrelation coefficients and standard deviations priors are stan-
dard in the literature. The priors of deep parameters that are related to the supply side
of banks are from Gerali et al. (2010). The values of other priors are from Nana-Davies
(2018).
The model is estimated using the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm consisting of two
26 Del Negro and Schorfheide (2006) provide a discussion on priors.
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separate chains with 1,000,000 draws each (Adjemian et al. (2011)). Along with the
posterior mean and standard deviation, the highest posterior density interval (HPDI),
computed between 10% and 90%, is shown in the last two columns in Table 2a and
2b27.
The price indexation parameter κd is 0.512. It implies that non-optimizing firms
give a slight weight to previous year’s inflation when they set their current price. The
Calvo proportion of firms that do not re-optimize, ξ, is 0.195, suggesting and expected
lifetime of price of 1.25 years. The elasticities of substitution ηc and ηi between domes-
tic and imported consumption goods and between domestic and imported investment
goods are 2.92 and 0.05 respectively. Domestic substitutes of imported investment
goods either do not exist or are mostly poor while imported consumption goods can
be more easily replaced. The posterior shares of imported goods in consumption -
ωc = 0.10 - and in investment - ωi = 0.55 - corroborate the different degrees of
substitutability in both type of goods highlighted by estimated demand elasticities.
The habit in consumption of entrepreneurs - κe = 0.72 - is bigger than that of
type I households - κa = 0.57 - because the former has more financing options than
the latter. The posterior elasticity of substitution between varieties of domestic goods
(θ) implies a 3.1% mark-up in the domestic goods market. That value is much lower
than those found in advanced economies - above 10% - where there are arguably many
more ways to differentiate goods (PMG (2016)). The risk adjustment parameter φ˜
s
is
positive at 1.72, implying a lower premium on net foreign assets when interest rate
differential is positive. It follows that if the deviation of the domestic interest from
its NSS level is bigger than its foreign counterpart, the risk adjustment term Φt will
be increasing to prompt the country to reduce its foreign liabilities. The posterior
elasticity of loan demand by entrepreneurs - ηbe = 3.18 - is close to 3.12 calibrated by
Gerali et al. (2010). The resource used up in the management of bank capital (or bank
capital depreciation rate) δbk = 0.01 is much lower than the calibrated value of 0.1049
obtained in Gerali et al. A lower number of extended loans and the amount involved
may explain such a low value. The persistence of AR(1) shocks ranges between 0.49
and 0.95. It is noteworthy that none is close to one, implying that the demeaned growth
rates of most observed data is matched (Christiano et al (2011)).
From the posteriors plots (not shown), data appear to be a little less informative for
the shock parameters ρπc , ρεbkr , and the deep parameters ωc, ξ and κd. However, their
posteriors are close to those estimated in Nana-Davies (2018). Overall, the posteriors
are credible. Therefore, the model provides a sensible representation of the data. We
proceed with the economic implications of the estimation.
27 Priors-posteriors plots and convergence statistics are available upon request.
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Table 2a: Prior and posterior distribution of parameters.
Prior Posterior
Parameter Description Density Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 10% 90%
δbk Bank capital depreciation rate B 0.005 0.0005 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.006
ηbe Elasticity of loan demand by entrepreneur IG 3 0.3 3.181 0.356 2.626 3.741
ηc Elasticity of subst. between imported and domestic cons. good G 3.2 0.3 2.921 0.245 2.539 3.344
ηi Elasticity of subst. between imported and domestic inv. good G 0.05 0.005 0.051 0.005 0.043 0.059
θ Elasticity of substitution between varieties of domestic goods G 31 3.1 33.20 3.102 28.24 38.48
ξ Calvo probability of no price reoptimization B 0.2 0.02 0.195 0.019 0.163 0.227
κd Price indexation parameter B 0.51 0.05 0.512 0.049 0.432 0.595
κa Habit in consumption (Type I households) B 0.6 0.06 0.575 0.057 0.481 0.671
κe Habit in consumption (Entrepreneur) B 0.8 0.08 0.723 0.082 0.598 0.861
σq Demand for money curvature parameter G 10 1 8.096 0.903 6.610 9.567
φ˜s Risk adjustment parameter G 1.25 1 1.716 0.095 1.551 1.867
ωc Share of imported consumption B 0.1 0.01 0.099 0.01 0.083 0.116
ωi Share of imported capital investment B 0.6 0.06 0.55 0.035 0.493 0.608
ρεπ∗ Persistence, foreign inflation B 0.85 0.075 0.726 0.084 0.597 0.873
ρεy Persistence, stationary output B 0.85 0.075 0.868 0.06 0.780 0.958
ρπc Persistence, target inflation B 0.85 0.075 0.844 0.078 0.727 0.968
ρφ˜u Persistence, country risk premium shock B 0.85 0.075 0.955 0.022 0.921 0.988
ρµz Persistence, trend growth shock B 0.85 0.075 0.489 0.02 0.457 0.521
ρ
εR
∗FZ Persistence, interest rate on reserves B 0.85 0.075 0.812 0.077 0.697 0.947
ρεS Persistence, nominal exchange rate B 0.85 0.075 0.903 0.049 0.828 0.98
ρεm Persistence, money shock B 0.85 0.075 0.784 0.08 0.655 0.917
ρεc Persistence, consumption shock B 0.85 0.075 0.789 0.072 0.67 0.905
ρεbkr Persistence, banks’ reserves B 0.85 0.075 0.842 0.081 0.713 0.964
ρ
Ta
Persistence, tax revenue (Type I household) B 0.85 0.075 0.868 0.06 0.773 0.963
ρ
Tna
Persistence, tax revenue (Type II household) B 0.85 0.075 0.868 0.06 0.773 0.963
ρ
Toil
Persistence, tax revenue (Entrepreneur) B 0.85 0.075 0.868 0.06 0.773 0.963
ρG Persistence, government expenditure persistence B 0.85 0.075 0.871 0.061 0.776 0.964
ρΠbk Persistence, banks’ profit persistence B 0.85 0.075 0.842 0.081 0.719 0.968
ρh Persistence, land B 0.85 0.075 0.934 0.033 0.883 0.986
Density: B: Beta; G: Gamma; IG: Inverse Gamma. Based on two separate metropolis chains with 1,000,000 draws each.. Scale factor set to obtain an acceptance rate
in the 0.30 neighborhood. HPDI: 90%. Univariate convergence diagnostic: Brooks and Gelman (1998).
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Table 2b: Prior and posterior standard deviation of shock.
Prior Posterior
Parameter Description Density Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 10% 90%
σεπ∗ Size of foreign inflation shock IG 0.5 ∞ 0.086 0.01 0.069 0.103
σεy Size of Stationary output shock IG 0.5 ∞ 0.127 0.021 0.091 0.16
σεπc Size of Target inflation shock IG 0.5 ∞ 0.406 0.249 0.119 0.763
σεφ˜u Size of country risk premium shock IG 0.5 ∞ 2.417 0.512 1.566 3.45
σεµz Size of the trend growth shock IG 0.5 ∞ 0.101 0.014 0.079 0.123
σ
εR
∗FZ Size of the interest rate on reserves shock IG 0.5 ∞ 0.089 0.012 0.070 0.108
σεS Size of the nominal exchange rate shock IG 0.5 ∞ 0.101 0.013 0.079 0.122
σεm Size of money shock IG 0.5 ∞ 0.156 0.035 0.101 0.207
σεc Size of Consumption shock IG 0.5 ∞ 1.072 0.384 0.419 1.705
σεbkr Size of Bank reserves shock IG 0.5 ∞ 0.374 0.199 0.123 0.667
σεTa Size of tax shock (Type I household) IG 0.5 ∞ 0.409 0.222 0.125 0.744
σεTna Size of tax shock (Type II household) IG 0.5 ∞ 0.214 0.029 0.167 0.261
σ
εT
oil Size of tax shock (Entrepreneur) IG 0.5 ∞ 0.530 0.063 0.430 0.630
σεG Size of the government expenditure shock IG 0.5 ∞ 0.264 0.057 0.172 0.354
σ
εΠ
bk Size of banks’ profit shock IG 0.5 ∞ 0.067 0.006 0.059 0.075
σεh Size of stock of land shock IG 0.5 ∞ 0.071 0.007 0.059 0.081
Density: B: Beta; G: Gamma; IG: Inverse Gamma. Based on two separate metropolis chains with 1,000,000 draws each.. Scale factor set to obtain an acceptance rate
in the 0.30 neighborhood. HPDI: 90%. Univariate convergence diagnostic: Brooks and Gelman (1998).
4 Economic implications
The economic analysis of the estimation is done in two steps. First, we explore the pos-
terior variance decompositions to spot shocks that have a sizeable contribution to the
variations of output, investment, consumption and foreign exchange reserves. Second,
we describe the impulse response functions of those shocks on variables.
4.1 Variance decomposition
The posterior conditional variance decomposition is shown for the first and the eight
period to cover the business cycle fluctuations span that runs from 6 to 32 quarters.
Figure 1 exhibits the mean conditional variance decomposition one year after a
shock. The gamut of colors shows that variables are quite spread over the shocks. For
instance, if we consider a 75%-threshold, we note that the price of land, q, needs four
shocks (or 4 colors) to reach that threshold. In that respect, 47% of variables need more
than four shocks, 41.2% between 3 and 4 shocks, and 11.8% between 1 to 2 shocks.28.
28 The 16 variables of the 47%-group include: lAC, lNA, rb, r, nx, pkpr, cAC, cNA, y, rh, q, Rk, l,
rbg, rd, and rbe. The 14 variables of the 41.2%-group include: rkbar, u, pinv, bstr, eq, inv, hE, hAC,
k w, d, be, bg, and mon (See Table 3 for the meaning of variables).
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Figure 1:
Figure 1: Posterior mean conditional variance decomposition one period after a
shock.
Note: Variables are on the X-axis; Contribution of each shock on a given variable on the
Y-axis. See text and tables for symbols’ meaning.
From the standpoint of the effect of shocks, there are broadly four categories: six
shocks explain less than 20% of any variable, three shocks between 20 and 50%, five
shocks between 50 and 70% , and one shock more than 75% of at least one variable.
For instance, a risk adjustment shock (phitil_eps) belongs to the third category because
it contributes 62.48% of the foreign interest rate on net foreign assets 29. Foreign
inflation, permanent technology and consumption shocks stand out for their massive
effect on a few variables in the first period. Except for the foreign interest rate, whose
variations mainly stem from the risk adjustment shock, it is reassuring that there are
many shocks contributing to open economy variables (eq, cbxr, bstr, and nx).
We turn to a quantitative assessment to comment the mean conditional variance
decomposition in the 8th period (Table 3). There is a surge in the contribution of
permanent technology and land shocks. For instance, between the first and the eight
29 The shocks’ categories are as follows: Category 1 shocks (less than 20%): transitory output (y_eps),
inflation target (pictar_eps), interest rate on foreign exchange reserves (RstrFZ_eps), lump-sum tax on
Type I household (tAC_eps), money (m_eps), lump-sum tax on Type II household (tNA_eps) Category
2 shocks (20%-50%): Lump-sum tax on entrepreneurs (toil_eps), government spending (g_eps), bank profit
(bkpr_eps). Category 3 shocks (50%-75%): foreign inflation (pistar_eps), nominal exchange rate (slev_eps),
land stock (hbar_eps), consumption (c_eps), risk adjustment (phitil_eps). Category 4 shock: (more than
75%) permanent technology (muz_eps).
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period, the contribution of technology and land service shocks to the variation of output
jump from 53.27% and 1.53% to 71.58% and 13.43% respectively. That outcome is
expected for technology shock which is a unit root shock. The surge in the contribution
land shock is due to its services being used as an input by intermediate good producers.
Bank related variables have a different story though. Instead of land shock continuing
to be one of the main sources of their variations, variables such as the amount of loan,
interest rates and deposits are now mainly driven by bank profit shock. Interestingly,
the contribution of few shocks to the variation of variables has vanished. Moreover,
some variables such as cash holdings are spread over more shocks than they did in the
first period. Those outcomes testify to the strength of the model’s dynamics in the busi-
ness cycle time horizon. We now turn to the posterior mean variance decomposition to
look at the long run linkages.
Table 4 shows the posterior mean variance. Aside from the prominent role of tech-
nology and land shocks, it can be noted that fiscal policy shocks matter through their
effects on bank and land variables even at an infinite horizon.
Lump-sum tax on entrepreneurs and government spending shocks (toil_eps and
g_eps) have a low but highly persistent contribution on the variations of output, land
price and its rental rate.
Those shocks also contribute to the variations of bank variables - be, rbe, rd and rbg.
Therefore, our estimation corroborates the importance of government’s transactions on
banks’ balance sheet and its effects on financial intermediation (World Bank (1986)
and lately IMF (2018)).
We regard that corroboration as a further validation of our model being a good
description of the data because the "sovereign-banks" nexus in the CEMAC have been
highlighted elsewhere (IMF (2017b)).
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Table 3: Posterior mean conditional variance decomposition (in %) Period 8
pistar_eps phitil_eps muz_eps slev_eps tAC_eps toil_eps g_eps bkpr_eps hbar_eps m_eps c_eps
Inflation (pic) 60.16 0 0.4 38.98 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.25 0.06 0.01
Money (mon) 38 0 32.92 7.04 0.08 0.01 0.09 10.6 0.41 2.27 8.06
Government’s loan (bg) 0.01 0 0.72 0 0.02 0.1 0.07 97.8 1.28 0 0
Entrepreneurs’ loan (be) 0.01 0 24.87 0.02 0.63 3.14 2.42 26.92 41.92 0 0.01
Households’ deposits (d) 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 99.99 0 0 0
Loan rate entrepreneurs (rbe) 0.02 0 1.36 0 3.86 19 17.11 33.14 25.17 0 0.01
Deposit rate (rd) 2.43 0 34.17 0.55 1.33 6.59 6.53 2.37 43.66 1.72 0.5
Loan rate government (rbg) 0.01 0 0.95 0 4.69 22.96 20.37 35.34 15.27 0 0
Aggregate labor (l) 27.25 0 7.16 2.47 0.42 0.26 0.38 11.61 8.41 3.34 38.41
Wage (w) 11.58 0 75.08 1 0.04 0.08 0.12 3.6 2.75 1.71 2.06
Capital return (Rk) 6.98 0 10.18 3.35 0.26 1.25 1.8 0.7 71.17 1.16 2.66
Capital stock (kbar) 0.06 0 99.82 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0 0.01
Capital. service. (k) 5.24 0 81.53 0.92 0.03 0.26 0.17 1.11 8.02 0.82 1.06
Households’ land. (hAC) 0.02 0 70.73 0.01 0.26 1.32 1.19 0.53 25.91 0 0
Entrepreneurs’ land.(hE) 0.02 0 70.52 0.01 0.26 1.31 1.19 0.53 26.14 0 0
Land price(q) 4.98 0 18.65 3.46 1.41 6.87 6.21 3.53 51.9 0.86 1.67
Land rental (rh) 5.87 0 11.27 4.01 1.56 7.57 6.9 3.78 55.67 1 1.82
Output (y) 1.41 0 71.58 0.58 0.08 0.41 0.3 0.32 13.43 0.31 9.87
Hshld II cons. (cNA) 14.52 0 51.69 1.17 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.52 0.49 1.74 28.22
Hshld I cons. (cAC) 17.62 0 31.85 0.72 0.37 0.05 0.27 12.54 0.99 1.04 33.2
Investment (inv) 3.61 0 65.58 1.46 0.25 1.34 1.23 1.03 23.69 0.5 1.06
Real exchange rate (eq) 9.12 0 76.54 1.58 0.02 0.15 0.1 2.33 4.35 1.21 1.16
Net foreign assets (bstr) 13.47 0 12.89 2.94 0.25 1.22 1.67 1.46 61.11 1.5 2.91
Foreign exchange reserves (cbxr) 17.37 0 14.41 0.71 0.04 0.01 0.03 4.01 0.15 0.87 3.08
Price new capital (pinv) 9.12 0 76.54 1.58 0.02 0.15 0.1 2.33 4.35 1.21 1.16
Price installed capital (pkpr) 7.43 0 28.12 2.78 0.22 1.04 1.44 1.1 53.28 1.12 2.27
Capital utilization rate (u) 6.91 0 75.85 1.2 0.03 0.35 0.23 1.44 10.44 1.07 1.38
Net export ratio (nx) 2.48 0 55.54 0.45 0.019 1.1 0.58 0.88 16.93 0.41 18.94
Foreign rate (Rstar)∗ 3.63 49.34 4.74 1.59 0.15 0.72 0.88 0.33 36.41 0.75 1.22
Capital rental rate (rkbar) 9.14 0 76.05 1.59 0.02 0.15 0.1 2.34 4.29 1.21 1.18
Wholesale loan rate (r) 0.02 0 3.21 0.05 2.55 12.46 12.49 0.92 67.87 0.19 0.02
Wholesale deposit rate (rb) 0.02 0 2.29 0.01 1.73 8.42 8.28 13.15 65.92 0.01 0.02
Labor Hshld I (lAC) 19.08 0 7.05 1.88 0.93 0.49 0.63 27.4 13.01 2.68 26.61
Labor Hshld II (lNA) 24.43 0 29.36 1.96 0.02 0.1 0.14 0.19 4.67 2.49 36.42
Note:(*) Contribution of the shock on Rstar_FZ (not shown to save space): 59.11%
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Table 4 : Posterior mean variance decomposition (in %)
pistar_eps
επ
∗
t
phitil_eps
ε
φ˜u
t
muz_eps
εµ
z
t
slev_eps
εSt
tAC_eps
εT
a
t
toil_eps
εT
oil
t
g_eps
εgt
bkpr_eps
εbkrt
hbar_eps
εht
m_eps
εmt
c_eps
εct
pic 60.22 0 0.54 38.73 0 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.29 0.06 0.01
mon 0.03 0 70.56 0.01 0.27 1.32 1.2 0.53 26.05 0 0
bg 0.02 0 54.08 0.01 0.2 0.97 0.88 24.76 19.08 0 0
be 0.02 0 70.39 0.01 0.26 1.31 1.19 0.95 25.84 0 0
d 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 99.99 0 0 0
rbe 0.02 0 44.97 0.01 0.8 3.88 3.38 28.15 18.73 0 0
rd 2.43 0 34.17 0.55 1.33 6.59 6.53 2.37 43.66 1.72 0.5
rbg 0.02 0 47.89 0.01 0.66 3.24 2.79 27.63 17.71 0 0
l 0.03 0 70.53 0.01 0.27 1.33 1.2 0.53 26.01 0 0.01
w 0.02 0 70.57 0.01 0.27 1.32 1.2 0.53 26.06 0 0
Rk 6.96 0 10.41 3.33 0.26 1.25 1.8 0.7 70.99 1.16 2.65
kbar 0.02 0 70.56 0.01 0.27 1.33 1.2 0.53 26.06 0 0
k 0.02 0 70.77 0.01 0.26 1.31 1.19 0.53 25.88 0 0
hAC 0.02 0 70.66 0.01 0.26 1.32 1.19 0.53 25.98 0 0
hE 0.02 0 70.66 0.01 0.26 1.32 1.19 0.53 25.98 0 0
q 0.02 0 70.66 0.01 0.26 1.32 1.19 0.53 25.98 0 0
rh 0.03 0 70.58 0.01 0.27 1.33 1.2 0.54 26.01 0 0
y 0.02 0 70.58 0.01 0.26 1.32 1.2 0.53 26.05 0 0
cNA 0.02 0 70.56 0.01 0.27 1.32 1.2 0.53 26.06 0 0
cAC 0.02 0 70.56 0.01 0.27 1.33 1.2 0.53 26.06 0 0
inv 0.02 0 70.56 0.01 0.27 1.33 1.2 0.53 26.07 0 0
eq 0.02 0 71.13 0.01 0.26 1.29 1.17 0.53 26.07 0 0
bstr 0.09 0 70.29 0.01 0.27 1.33 1.2 0.53 25.56 0 0
cbxr 0.03 0 70.39 0.01 0.26 1.32 1.19 0.53 26.22 0.01 0.02
pinv 0.02 0 71.13 0.01 0.26 1.29 1.17 0.53 25.56 0 0
pkpr 0.03 0 71.09 0.01 0.26 1.29 1.17 0.53 25.59 0 0
u 0.02 0 71.12 0.01 0.26 1.29 1.17 0.53 25.56 0 0
nx 0.04 0 70.66 0.01 0.26 1.31 1.18 0.54 25.76 0 0.18
Rstar 2.4 65.9 3.7 1.04 0.1 0.48 0.58 0.26 24.08 0.49 0.81
rkbar 0.02 0 71.13 0.01 0.26 1.29 1.17 0.53 25.56 0 0
r 0.02 0 3.24 0.05 2.55 12.45 12.49 0.92 67.85 0.19 0.02
rb 0.02 0 23.69 0.01 1.09 5.34 5.14 20.05 44.54 0.01 0.01
lAC 0.03 0 70.51 0.01 0.27 1.33 1.2 0.54 26.08 0 0.01
lNA 0.03 0 70.56 0.01 0.26 1.32 1.2 0.53 26.05 0 0.01
Note:(*) Contribution of the shock Rstar_FZ (not shown): 59.11%. Otherwise, shocks contributing less than 1% for all variables are omitted. See Table 3 for variable
definitions.
4.2 Bayesian impulse response functions
In order to shed light on the propagation mechanism in the economy, we look at the
Bayesian impulse response functions (IRFs) of a permanent technology shock, a con-
sumption shock, a foreign inflation shock and a shock in banks’ profit (Figure 2a, 2b,
2c, and 2d).
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4.2.1 Permanent technology shock
Figure 2a shows that a standard deviation shock to permanent technology brings about
a rise in aggregate employment for the first two periods, followed by a steady fall
below its NSS level throughout the adjustment process. However, the IRFs of labor of
both types of households show that even though they overshoot their respective NSS
levels in the first two years and keep on falling thereafter, they do so in quite different
contexts. Labor from households who have access to land market and bank deposits are
declining while they are lower than their NSS levels whereas for the Type II household,
that decline is occurring from above its NSS level.
From the consumption IRFs, we notice that constrained households are hit harder
than unconstrained households at the outset and so are willing to work more to re-
store their consumption. Interestingly, intermediated good producers know that and
they substitute labor from constrained households for labor from Type I households.
Type I households are forced to draw down their assets, aggressively as far as land is
concerned, to bring back their equilibrium consumption.
Intermediate good producers must also adjust their demand for land and capital ser-
vice after a shock to permanent technology. The aggressive selling of land by house-
holds brings about a sharp fall of their price that benefit entrepreneurs both at acquiring
and lending it to firms. Firms reduce capital service as their rental rate increases while
their flat rate of return over the adjustment process prompts entrepreneurs to reduce the
investment in physical capital. Therefore, the available stock of physical capital takes a
long time to crawl towards in NSS value. Overall, output falls at the outset and remains
below its NSS level following the changes in consumption, inputs and their prices.
Considering the external dimension, net export and foreign exchange reserves fall
while net foreign assets do not change at the outset. In the following periods, net ex-
ports keep on deteriorating leading to continuous accumulation of foreign debt (mod-
elled as capital inflows) and loss of foreign exchange reserves. The loss in foreign
exchange reserves bottoms in the second period where the risk adjustment term must
be lower because the domestic interest comes close to its NSS level and the lagged
foreign interest rate on current NFA is below its NSS value. Comparing U-shaped IRF
of foreign exchange reserves in the one hand and the shapes of the IRFs of net foreign
assets, foreign and domestic interest rates on the other hand, it can be inferred that the
risk adjustment term, which controls the law of motion of foreign debt service, is the
key driver of the pace of foreign exchange reserves’ adjustment.
4.2.2 Consumption shock
A standard deviation shock to aggregate consumption translates into an initial increase
in output and consumption of both types of households (Figure 2b). Subsequently,
output and Type II households’ consumption steadily decrease towards their respec-
tive NSS levels while Type I household’s consumption follows a hump-shaped pattern
because of habit in consumption. To meet the increased demand, firms increase the
demand for labor and capital service but decrease the demand for land service. The de-
crease in land service is caused by an initial jump in the price of land and a subsequent
decrease that stabilizes above its NSS level. Thus, the reduced return to entrepreneurs
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prompts them to provide less land service to firms. In contrast, entrepreneurs increase
the capital service they rent to firms and the utilization rate of physical capital they
provide them with. The physical cost of increasing the utilization rate of capital is low
enough to enable entrepreneurs reap a hump-shaped above NSS renting rate of capital.
However, the return in physical capital is on average flat over the first four periods pre-
ceding its return to equilibrium. The flat return on physical capital brings about a fall
of investment and a flat price of installed capital.
Bank variables show that a steep fall in interest rates occurs at the outset and leads
to a jump in loan extended to entrepreneurs after a consumption shock. The inverse
happens in the next period from where interest rates stabilize near their NSS level while
loan decreases gradually towards its NSS level. Entrepreneurs are gradually reducing
their loan demand because they are facing a gradual decline of new investment’s price.
Turning to the open economy dimension, it can be noted that the consumption of
imported goods increases while the imported investment good decreases but the latter
must be decreasing more because the net export ratio is positive throughout the process.
Foreign debt moves sideways from the first to the fifth period before stabilizing a little
above its NSS from where it slowly moves towards that level. Foreign exchange re-
serves decrease at the beginning of the adjustment process, reach their lowest level in
sixth period then move towards its NSS level. The U-shaped IRF of foreign exchange
reserves implies that the net export surplus is not high enough to compensate for the
servicing of foreign debt. The effective interest rate on foreign debt is bigger than
the risk-free international rate throughout the adjustment process because the domestic
interest rate and the foreign debt are above their NSS levels.
4.2.3 Foreign inflation shock
Figure 2c shows the IRFs for a standard deviation shock to foreign inflation (σεπ∗ =
0.086). Domestic consumer price inflation and the real exchange rate jump because
importers pass on the increase in foreign price to the domestic consumers and entre-
preneurs. Consumption of both types of households fall and gradually revert to their
respective NSS levels. The consumption path of households that have access to the land
market and bank deposits is U-shaped since they can use both assets to smooth their
consumption. Domestic output recovers swiftly even though the consumption recovery
process is slower, implying a swift adjustment in the inputs side.
It can be seen from the IRFs of labor, capital utilization rate, capital service and
land service that domestic intermediate good firms prioritize land service and labor to
swiftly cope with a foreign inflation shock. That input choice is sensible because wage
is climbing to its NSS value after its initial fall and the rental rate of land is already at
its NSS value starting from the third period while the rental rate of capital is moving
towards its NSS level after having overshot that level at the outset.
Entrepreneurs, who acquire land and physical capital to be rented to firms, are
adding to their land stock but not to their capital stock as the return on capital is on
average flat after the foreign inflation shock. They are adding to their stock of land be-
cause the initial sharp fall of their price have prompted households to sell immediately
and they keep on selling to restore their consumption level. Entrepreneurs are taking
loans from domestic banks but in very small amount because even if the lending rate
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is back to its NSS after its initial fall their collateral constraint must be binding in the
process.
From the external dimension standpoint, net exports fall at the outset then improves
to return to its equilibrium. The capital outflow induce by the negative net export ratio
is financed by an increase capital inflow because net foreign assets are above their
NSS level. The country is losing reserves because outflows are bigger than inflows.
However, that foreign exchange reserves process bottoms in the fourth period where
the foreign interest rate, after having moving sideways, returns to its NSS level and so
induces a lower value for the risk adjustment term. At that period, the domestic interest
rate also peaks. Thereafter, the risk adjustment term, which is not yet equal to one,
starts to decrease along with the domestic interest rate and net foreign assets bringing
about the gradual improvement of foreign exchange reserves holdings.
4.2.4 Bank profit shock
Figure 2d shows the IRFs for a standard deviation shock banks’ profits. That shock
stems from a decrease in the interbank rate -assumed to be equal to the net wholesale
deposit rate paid to deposit branch- which brings about a decrease in the net wholesale
loan rate charged by wholesale bank to loan branch. Those wholesale interest rate
decreases spark a fall in the interest rate on households’ deposits and a dramatic fall
in the nominal interest rate on loan to entrepreneurs. A spike in entrepreneurs’ loan
demand ensues along with a sharp fall of households’ deposits who are grappling to
keep up with their consumption as their wage revenues are also declining. To cope
with that adverse situation, they flood the land market by massive selling causing the
land price to drop. Entrepreneurs snap the land up thanks to an increase in bank loans
and a looser collateral constraint. Besides their acquisitions of land, entrepreneurs
increase their investment in physical capital taking advantage of their lower price.
Intermediate good producers, who rent capital and land services from the entrepre-
neurs and hire households, adapt their input choice to the new economic landscape.
The IRFs of Type I and Type II households’ labor show that firms are restoring their
labor input by skewing their payroll in favor of the latter. Therefore, aggregate labor is
improving along with Type II households’ labor.
The IRFs of wage, bank deposits and labor show that Type I households bear the
brunt of a bank profit’s shock because they cannot take out loans from banks. At this
point, it is worth recalling that households’ poor collateral, stemming from the land
tenure system and law enforcement problems, is one of the biggest impediments to an
adequate financial inclusion in Cameroon (IMF (2009, 2018)).
Output undershoots then overshoots its NSS value during the first four periods pre-
ceding the initiation of a U-shaped adjustment path. Interestingly, consumption of
both types of households jumps initially then decreases to revert to equilibrium. Con-
strained households gradually decrease their consumption by optimizing their cash
holdings. Unconstrained household smooth their consumption overtime by using an
optimal combination of cash holdings, land sale and reduced savings at the banks that
is consistent with their consumption habit. Therefore, their consumption adjustment
path is hump-shaped.
Net export increases in the first period then steadily falls below its NSS level until
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the ninth period from where it starts moving towards that level. After the first three peri-
ods where the country swings from net foreign creditor to net foreign debtor, the coun-
try achieves a maximum accumulation of foreign claims in the fourth period. There-
after, claims accumulation on non-residents steadily reverts (from below) towards its
NSS level. The NFA’s favorable outcome induces foreign reserves accumulation. It
can be seen that the hump-shaped IRF of the latter is located above its NSS throughout
the adjustment process. Foreign exchange accumulation reaches its peak in the sixth
period where the gap between the domestic interest rate and its NSS value is minimum.
At this stage, it is worthwhile to recall that a bank profit shock is associated with a
sharp fall of wholesale interest rates, interest rates on loan to entrepreneurs and govern-
ment bonds. Moreover, government bonds demand is lower throughout the adjustment
process. Overall, the favorable effects of this shock suggests that high interest rates,
which is one of the symptom of the fear of lending, are among the impediments to
economic expansion in the country.
4.2.5 Other low-effect shocks
To save space, we have not commented on the IRF of a government spending shock.
However, it should be noted that a government spending shock does increase house-
holds’ consumption because of the presence of two types of households and price stick-
iness in the model as suggested in Galí et al. (2007). The consumption of both types
of households overshoot their respective NSS levels at the outset then revert to those
values, steadily for Type II households and following a hump-shaped path for Type I
households.
The effects of a selected shocks on a selected set of variables are given in Table 5.
Most of the shocks are expansionary but the posterior variance decompositions have
shown that their contribution is lower than those of the shocks described above.
Table 5: Cumulative variation over 8 periods (increase : +; decrease: -; little
change: ≃)
Variables
Shocks Output
Foreign
Reserves
Investment
Consumption.
Type I
Consumption.
Type II
Inflation
y_eps + + + + + small +
slev_eps ≃ + short + (3 years) - - +
m_eps small + - ≃ + + small +
tAC_eps + small - - - small - small +
tNA_eps small + small - - - - small -
toil_eps short + (4 years) small - - - + small -
g_eps + small + + + + small +
Note: short + (3 years) means NSS value after 3 years.;(increase : +; decrease: -; little change: ≃);y_eps: stationary output shock; slev_eps: nominal exchange
rate shock; m_eps: money demand shock; tAC_eps: Lump-sum tax on Type I households; tNA_eps: Lump-sum tax on Type II households; toil_eps: Lump-sum tax on
Entrepreneurs; g_eps: Government expenditures shock.
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5 Conclusion
We model the supply side of the banking sector, two types of households and a land
asset collateral in a small open economy model that accounts for some of the most
enduring features and provisions of the Franc Zone. The model is estimated using the
Metropolis-Hasting algorithm consisting of two separate chains with 1,000,000 draws
each and Cameroon’s data over the sample period 1979-2016. Among our findings,
four stand out.
First, we find that sensible posteriors of some deep parameters are obtained when
the proportion of rule-of-thumb households is set to forty-eight percent, which is in the
range of the World Bank’s (2019) estimates of the poverty headcount ratio and close to
the percentage of respondent not having a bank account by lack of money in its Findex
survey (IMF (2018), World Bank (2018)).
Second, the posterior variance decomposition at business cycle frequencies and the
mean variance decomposition show that permanent technology, bank profit, consump-
tion and foreign inflation shocks are the key drivers of macroeconomic fluctuations in
that country.
Third, among those shocks, only bank profit shock brings about an output expan-
sion. That shock is associated with a sharp drop of wholesale interest rates, leading us
to infer that high interest rates, which is one of the symptom of the fear of lending, are
among the main impediments to economic expansion.
Fourth, fiscal policy shocks matter but through their effects on banks’ balance sheet
because they contribute to the deviations of interest rates even at the infinite horizon as
shown by the posterior mean variance decomposition.
Two more general findings are worth noting to conclude the paper.
Franc Zone’s monetary authorities recognize that the fiscal balance criterion used
until 2017 had significant weaknesses, both in terms of design and implementation. As
they are considering a change in the workings of their monetary union by moving to
a market based monetary financing of budget deficit in member countries, the supply
side of the banking sector modelled here can be easily adapted to suit that fix if it
materializes.
Cameroon’s average real growth per capita is barely positive during our estimation
period. It follows that notwithstanding any architecture fix of the Franc Zone, the coun-
try needs a brand new range of structural policies to deal with mostly contractionary
shocks that are buffeting its economy.
Figure 2: Bayesian impulse response functions (IRFs)
Bayesian IRFs are the mean impulse responses. The gray shaded areas provide highest posterior density intervals. Also note that first order IRFs are scale invariant.
So, variation on the y-axis can be interpreted as percent or basis points.
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